


Security and authentication



```
root@topi:/etc# more shadow
root:$6$1z2.CqoJ$bIb7H0C7ByvSVcLmpc1C5F/H.gAddflg1xa2fQKnMA0abwZI1YSLDiK2gIKuEbeo
uGj33w8H4QDiWYvamlfIj2eu.:15138:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:15040:0:99999:7:::
keithwork:$6$CRDEfvR2Q$B8.0J5P/7TvuaIkFfAFfe5a234.GgnFBGRfHKb6.jpTN223ZMja0ILte
1FoE6vzlf7Rt/einBSqfeegEVxs33fe#f7x0:15135:0:99999:7:::
mysql:!:15087:0:99999:7:::
httpd:!:15133:0:99999:7:::
keithbackup:$6$whkE4GJT$yUMfE4gYwhp656rNqv/7see8y5aF/Vgra3FUe.g4Facg4Iug4vyJLg4F
bgeZW0i7feqMPCHQpBsJi/:15164:0:99999:7:::
```

Overview


- Authentication
 - Passwords
 - One-way hashing
 - Salting passwords
 - Other forms: tokens, biometrics
 - Digital signing
 - Public key based signing
 - PKI, CA
- Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
- Securing web commerce
 - SSL / TLS
 - https

Authentication

- Proving your identify
 - **Something you know:** password, PIN, pet's name
 - **Something you possess:** a key, smart card
 - **Something you are:** fingerprints, retina, face
 - **Something you do:** voice print, handwriting, typing rhythm
- Means of authentication
 - Password
 - Token-based
 - Biometric

Password authentication

- Users choose some secret password
 - Differing levels of required complexity/annoyance



<https://xkcd.com/936/>

THROUGH 20 YEARS OF EFFORT, WE'VE SUCCESSFULLY TRAINED EVERYONE TO USE PASSWORDS THAT ARE HARD FOR HUMANS TO REMEMBER, BUT EASY FOR COMPUTERS TO GUESS.

Password storage




- User ID and password
 - Must be stored somewhere, e.g. /etc/passwd
 - Shadow password file, e.g. /etc/shadow
 - Reachable only by privileged users

```
% more passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
work:x:1000:1000:./home/work:/bin/sh
mysql:x:104:110:MySQL Server,,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
httpd:x:1001:1001:./home/httpd:/bin/sh
backup:x:1005:1005:./home/backup:/bin/sh
```

```
% more shadow
root:$6$1z2.CqoJ$bIb7HOC7ByvSVcLmpc1C5F/H.gAddflg1xa2fQKnMA0abwZI1YSLDiK2gIKuEbeo
uGj33w8H4QDiwYvamlfIj2eu.:15138:0:99999:7:::
daemon*:15040:0:99999:7:::
work:$6$CRDEFvR2Q$B8.0J5P/7Tvua1kFfAFfe5a234.GgnFBGRfHKb6.jpTN223ZMja0ILte
1FoE6vzlf7Rt/eiNBSqfeegEVxs33fe#f7x0:15135:0:99999:7:::
mysql:!:15087:0:99999:7:::
httpd:!:15133:0:99999:7:::
backup:$6$whkE4GJT$yUMfE4gYwhp656rNqv/7see8y5aF/Vgra3FUe.g4Facg4Iug4vyJLg4F
bgeZW0i7feqMPCHQpBsJi/:15164:0:99999:7:::
```


Hashing

- Normal hash functions:
 - **Key:** large data set of variable length
 - **Value:** small data set of fixed length
 - Examples:
 - Error checking: checksum, CRC
 - Constant time data structures: Java HashMap




Secure hashing

- Secure hash functions:
 - Hash $H(x)$ easy to compute for x
 - One-way: given $h=H(x)$ intractable to find x
 - e.g. MD5 (128 bits), SHA-1 (160 bits), SHA-256 (256 bits), SHA-512 (512 bits)



Secure hashing

- Desirable properties
 - Pre-image resistant, one-way
 - For any code h , intractable to find x s.t. $H(x) = h$
 - 2nd pre-image resistant, weak collision resistant
 - For any block x , intractable to find $y \neq x$ s.t. $H(y) = H(x)$
 - Strong collision resistant
 - Intractable to find any pair (x, y) s.t. $H(x) = H(y)$
- Uses:
 - One-way encryption of passwords: store only hash
 - Intrusion detection: detect changes in file
 - Digital signing of messages



History:

- 1991: MD5 by Ron Rivest
- 1993: SHA-0
- 1995: Revised version, SHA-1
- 1996: Flaw found in MD5
- 2005: Attack found on SHA-1
- 2010: NIST required federal agencies to move to SHA-2
- 2012: NIST selects Keccak for SHA-3

<http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2012/06/06/more-information-about-the-digital-certificates-used-to-sign-the-flame-malware.aspx>

<http://www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/rogue-ca/>

One iteration within the SHA-1 compression function:

- A, B, C, D and E are 32-bit words of the state
- F is a nonlinear function that varies
- \lll_n denotes a left bit rotation by n places
- n varies for each operation
- W_t is the expanded message word of round t
- K_t is the round constant of round t
- Box with plus denotes addition modulo 2^{32}

Attacking passwords

- If hashed passwords compromised, attacker:
 - Knows **users with same password**
 - Can tell if user has **same password on multiple systems** (if using same hash function)
 - Can use an **offline dictionary attack**
- **Dictionary attack:**
 - Precompute hash value for:
 - All sequences of a given (short) length
 - Common words
 - Check for match against hash in password file

Salt



- Salting passwords
 - On account creation, assign **salt value**:
 - Timestamp, random value, ...
 - **Salt stored unencrypted**, associated with user ID
 - Hash computed from **salt plus user's password**
 - Makes **dictionary attack much more expensive**

```
% more shadow
root:$6$1z2.CqoJ$bIb7H0C7ByvSVcLmpc1C5F/H.gAddf1g1xa2fQKnMA0abwZI1YSLDiK2gIKuEbeo
uGj33w8H4QDiWYvamlfIj2eu.:15138:0:99999:7:::
daemon*:15040:0:99999:7:::
work:$6$CRDEFvR2Q$B8.0J5P/7Tvua1kFfAFfe5a234.GgnFBGRfHKb6.jpTN223ZMja0ILte
1FoE6vz1f7Rt/eiNBSqfeegEVxs33fe#f7x0:15135:0:99999:7:::
mysql!:15087:0:99999:7:::
httpd!:15133:0:99999:7:::
backup:$6$whkE4GJT$yUMfE4gYwhp656rNqv/7see8y5aF/Vgra3FUe.g4Facg4Iug4vyJLg4F
bgeZW0i7feqMPCHQpBsJi/:15164:0:99999:7:::
```

\$6 = SHA-512

Improving password security

- **Reactive password checker:**
 - **System attacks itself**, revokes guessed passwords
 - But system has to do an expensive amount of work
- **Proactive password checker:**
 - Users selects a candidate password
 - **System checks if allowable**
 - Hopefully guide users to secure choice
 - Without *too* much annoyance
 - But different systems have:
 - Different min/max lengths, allowed symbols, case rules, number rules, ...

Improving password security

- User education

- Encourage/force **longer more complex** passwords
 - e.g. Users often mistakenly believe reversing word makes password unguessable
- Use **first letter of personal phrase**
 - "My dog's first name is Rex" -> "MdfniR"
- Use **random collection of words**
 - "correcthorsebatterystaple"

- Computer-generated passwords

- Normally low acceptance, users write them down
- Generate pronounceable syllables, FIPS PUB 181

Token-based authentication


- Require users possess some object
 - Unique ID based
 - Magnetic strip, embedded microprocessor, ...
 - e.g. ATM card, mobile phone (two factor)
- Often in combination with user knowledge
 - e.g. ATM PIN



Biometric authentication


- **Pattern recognition based**
 - **Facial recognition:** location of facial features
 - **Fingerprints:** ridges and furrows on fingertip
 - **Hand geometry:** shape, length, width of fingers
 - **Retinal:** veins beneath retinal surface
 - **Iris:** structure of the iris
 - **Signature:** style of handwriting
 - **Voice:** patterns in speech signal
- **Verification:** proving you are who you say
- **Identification:** find out who you are

Biometric characteristics







http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~jgd1000/UK_IRIS.png



http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2012/02/17/article-0-11C5E3C400005DC-346_468x286.jpg




<http://www.nuance.com/for-business/by-solution/customer-service-solutions/solutions-services/inbound-solutions/voice-authentication-biometrics/vocal-password/index.htm>



<http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs/Web/People/jeongue/jeon/Speaker%20Verification.htm>

Digital signing





- **Problem:** impersonation in public-key crypto
 - Mallory encrypts message with Bob's public key
 - Only Bob can decrypt using his private key
 - Message is a love letter claiming to be from Alice

Digital signing

- Digital signing via public key crypto
 - Alice encrypts message with her private key
 - Everybody can decrypt using Alice's public key
 - But it proves it came from Alice since no one else has her private key
 - Encrypt result with Bob's public key
 - Only Bob can decrypt using his private key
 - **Problem:** asymmetric crypto can be expensive
 - Hash the message
 - Encrypt just the hash

Hash-based digital signing



If the hashes are equal, the signature is valid.

Distributing public keys


- Alice has to find Bob's public key
 - How does she know it is really Bob's key?
 - Someone else could impersonate Bob
 - Mallory fools Alice into using her fake Bob public key
 - Mallory decrypts using fake Bob's private key
 - Mallory reads message
 - Reencrypts using Bob's real public key and sends on
- Problems:
 - How do we **distribute public keys**?
 - How to **establish trust** of keys?

PKI

- Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)


- Certificate Authority (CA)

- Verifies user is who they say they are
- Digitally signs the user's public key
- e.g. VeriSign



PGP

- Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
 - 1991 Phil Zimmermann



"In the past, if the Government wanted to violate the privacy of ordinary citizens, it had to expend a certain amount of effort to intercept and steam open and read paper mail, and listen to and possibly transcribe spoken telephone conversation. This is analogous to catching fish with a hook and a line, one fish at a time. Fortunately for freedom and democracy, this kind of labor-intensive monitoring is not practical on a large scale.

Today, electronic mail is gradually replacing conventional paper mail, and is soon to be the norm for everyone, not the novelty it is today. Unlike paper mail, E mail messages are just too easy to intercept and scan for interesting keywords. This can be done easily, routinely, automatically, and undetectably on a grand scale. This is analogous to driftnet fishing-- **making a quantitative and qualitative Orwellian difference to the health of democracy.**"


-Philip Zimmermann, testimony to Congress

PGP

- Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
 - Focus on efficiency:
 - RSA for symmetric key exchange
 - Symmetric cipher (IDEA) for bulk of encryption
 - Focus on ease of use:
 - Allow average Joe to use strong cryptography
 - User clicks to encrypt/sign an email
 - First widely available public-key crypto
 - Released via friend to the Usenet
 - Problems:
 - RSA was patented by RSA Data Security, Inc.
 - Strong encryption considered a munition by US

K_M : One-time message key for IDEA

\otimes : Concatenation



• Key length

- 384 bits = casual, broken easily today
- 512 bits = commercial, breakable by 3-letter orgs
- 1024 bits = military, not breakable on earth
- 2048 bits = alien, unbreakable on other planets

Securing web commerce

- Customer fills out order with credit card #
 - **Problem 1:** Keep data secure from customer's browser to the web server
 - **Problem 2:** Keep data secure on server or in transit to order fulfillment

SSL

- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) / Transport Layer Security (TLS)
 - Client requests secure connection from server
 - Client sends list ciphers/hash functions supported
 - Server picks the strongest mutual cipher/hash
 - Server sends back digital certificate
 - Name of itself, trusted Certificate Authority (CA), public encryption key
 - Client contacts CA to confirm key belongs to site
 - Client generates session key by encrypting random number with server's public key
 - Client and server continue using symmetric cipher

HTTPS

- Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS)
 - https://
 - Typically running on port 443

Application (HTTP)
Security (SSL)
Transport (TCP)
Network (IP)
Data link (PPP)
Physical (modem, ADSL, cable TV)

Summary

- Proving who you are
 - Passwords, tokens, biometrics
 - Digital signing using public key crypto
- Secure hash functions
 - Digital signing, storage of passwords, detecting changes in files
- PGP
 - Popular application of public key crypto
- Secure web commerce
 - SSL/TLS