


Security and authentication



```
root@topi:/etc# more shadow
root:$6$1z2.CqoJ$bIb7H0C7ByvSVcLmpc1C5F/H.gAddflg1xa2fQKnMA0abwZI1YSLDiK2gIKuEbeo
uGj33w8H4QDiWYvamlfIj2eu.:15138:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:15040:0:99999:7:::
keithwork:$6$CRDEfvR2Q$B8.0J5P/7TvuaIkFfAFfe5a234.GgnFBGRfHKb6.jpTN223ZMja0ILte
1FoE6vzlf7Rt/einBSqfeegEVxs33fe#f7x0:15135:0:99999:7:::
mysql:!:15087:0:99999:7:::
httpd:!:15133:0:99999:7:::
keithbackup:$6$whkE4GJT$yUMfE4gYwhp656rNqv/7see8y5aF/Vgra3FUe.g4Facg4Iug4vyJLg4F
bgeZW0i7feqMPCHQpBsJi/:15164:0:99999:7:::
```

Overview


- Authentication
 - Passwords
 - One-way hashing
 - Salting passwords
 - Other forms: tokens, biometrics
 - Digital signing
 - Public key based signing
 - PKI, CA
- Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
- Securing web commerce
 - SSL / TLS
 - https

Authentication

- Proving your identify
 - **Something you know:** password, PIN, pet's name
 - **Something you possess:** a key, smart card
 - **Something you are:** fingerprints, retina, face
 - **Something you do:** voice print, handwriting, typing rhythm
- Means of authentication
 - Password
 - Token-based
 - Biometric

Password authentication

- Users choose some secret password
 - Differing levels of required complexity/annoyance



~28 BITS OF ENTROPY

$2^{28} = 3 \text{ DAYS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$


(PLAUSIBLE ATTACK ON A WEAK REMOTE WEB SERVICE. YES, CRACKING A STOLEN HASH IS FASTER, BUT IT'S NOT WHAT THE AVERAGE USER SHOULD WORRY ABOUT.)

DIFFICULTY TO GUESS: **EASY**

WAS IT TROMBONE? NO, TROUBADOR. AND ONE OF THE 0s WAS A ZERO?

AND THERE WAS SOME SYMBOL...

DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER: **HARD**



~44 BITS OF ENTROPY

$2^{44} = 530 \text{ YEARS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$

DIFFICULTY TO GUESS: **HARD**

THAT'S A BATTERY STAPLE.

CORRECT!

DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER: YOU'VE ALREADY MEMORIZED IT

<https://xkcd.com/936/>

THROUGH 20 YEARS OF EFFORT, WE'VE SUCCESSFULLY TRAINED EVERYONE TO USE PASSWORDS THAT ARE HARD FOR HUMANS TO REMEMBER, BUT EASY FOR COMPUTERS TO GUESS.

Password storage



- User ID and password
 - Must be stored somewhere, e.g. /etc/passwd
 - Shadow password file, e.g. /etc/shadow
 - Reachable only by privileged users

```
$ more passwd
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/bin/sh
keithwork:x:1000:1000:~/home/keithwork:/bin/sh
mysql:x:104:110:MySQL Server,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
httpd:x:1001:1001:~/home/httpd:/bin/sh
keithbackup:x:1005:1005:~/home/keithbackup:/bin/sh
```

```
root@topi:/etc# more shadow
root:$6$1z2.CqoJ$bIb7HOC7ByvSVcLmpc1C5F/H.gAddflg1xa2fQKnMA0abwZI1YSLDiK2gIKuEbeo
uGj33w8H4QDiWYvamlfIj2eu.:15138:0:99999:7:::
daemon*:15040:0:99999:7:::
keithwork:$6$CRDEFvR2Q$B8.0J5P/7TvualkFfAFfe5a234.GgnFBGRfHKb6.jpTN223ZMja0ILte
1FoE6vzlf7Rt/eiNBSqfeegEVxs33fe#f7x0:15135:0:99999:7:::
mysql:!:15087:0:99999:7:::
httpd:!:15133:0:99999:7:::
keithbackup:$6$whkE4GJT$yUMfE4gYwhp656rNqv/7see8y5aF/Vgra3FUe.g4Facg4Iug4vyJLg4F
bgeZW0i7feqMPCHQpBsJi/:15164:0:99999:7:::
```


Hashing

- Normal hash functions:
 - Key: large data set of variable length
 - Value: smaller data set of fixed length
 - e.g. checksum, CRC



Secure hashing

- Secure hash functions:
 - $H(x)$ easy to compute for x
 - One-way: given h , intractable to find x s.t. $H(x)=h$
 - e.g. MD5 (128 bits), SHA-1 (160 bits), SHA-256 (256 bits), SHA-512 (512 bits)



Secure hashing

- Desirable properties

- Pre-image resistant, one-way

- For any code h , intractable to find x s.t. $H(x) = h$

- 2nd pre-image resistant, weak collision resistant

- For any block x , intractable to find $y \neq x$ s.t. $H(y) = H(x)$

- Strong collision resistant


- Intractable to find any pair (x, y) s.t. $H(x) = H(y)$

- Uses:

- One-way encryption of passwords: store only hash

- Intrusion detection: detect changes in file

- Digital signing of messages



One iteration within the SHA-1 compression function:

A, B, C, D and E are 32-bit words of the state;

F is a nonlinear function that varies;

\lll_n denotes a left bit rotation by n places;

n varies for each operation;

W_t is the expanded message word of round t;

K_t is the round constant of round t;

Box with plus denotes addition modulo 2^{32} .

Attacking passwords

- If hashed password file compromised
 - Attacker knows users with same password
 - Attacker can tell if user has same password on multiple systems
 - Attacker can use an offline dictionary attack
- Dictionary attack
 - Precompute hash value for:
 - All sequences of a given (shortish) length
 - Common words
 - Check for match against hash in password file

Salt

- Salting passwords

- On account creation, system salt value
 - Timestamp, random value, ...
- Salt stored unencrypted, associated with user ID
- Hash computed from salt plus user password
- Makes dictionary attack much more expensive

```
root@topi:/etc# more shadow
root:$6$1z2.CqoJ$bIb7H0C7ByvSVcLmpc1C5F/H.gAddflg1xa2fQKnMA0abwZI1YSLDiK2gIKuEbeo
uGj33w8H4QDiWYvamlfIj2eu.:15138:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:15040:0:99999:7:::
keithwork:$6$CRDEfvR2Q$B8.0J5P/7Tvua1kFfAFfe5a234.GgnFBGRfHKb6.jpTN223ZMja0ILte
1FoE6vz1f7Rt/eiNBSqfeegEVxs33fe#f7x0:15135:0:99999:7:::
mysql!:15087:0:99999:7:::
httpd!:15133:0:99999:7:::
keithbackup:$6$whkE4GJT$yUMfE4gYwhp656rNqv/7see8y5aF/Vgra3FUe.g4Facg4Iug4vyJLg4F
bgeZW0i7feqMPCHQpBsJi/:15164:0:99999:7:::
```

Improving password security

- **Reactive password checking**
 - System periodically attacks itself, revokes passwords it guesses
 - But system has to do an expensive amount of work
- **Proactive password checker**
 - Users selects a candidate password
 - System checks to see if allowable
 - Hopefully guides users to secure choice without too much annoyance

Improving password security

- **User education**

- Encourage/force longer more complex passwords
 - e.g. Users often mistakenly believe reversing word makes password unguessable
- Use first letter of personal phrase
 - "My dog's first name is Rex" -> "MdfniR"
- Use random collection of words
 - "correcthorsebatterystaple"

- **Computer-generated passwords**

- Normally low acceptance, users write them down
- Generate pronounceable syllables, FIPS PUB 181

Token-based authentication


- Require users possess some object
 - Unique ID based
 - Magnetic strip, embedded microprocessor, ...
 - e.g. ATM card
- Often in combination with user knowledge
 - e.g. ATM PIN



Biometric authentication


- **Pattern recognition based**
 - **Facial recognition**: relative location of facial features
 - **Fingerprints**: ridges and furrows on fingertip
 - **Hand geometry**: shape, length, width of fingers
 - **Retinal**: veins beneath retinal surface
 - **Iris**: structure of the iris
 - **Signature**: style of handwriting
 - **Voice**: patterns in speech signal
- **Verification**: proving you are who you say
- **Identification**: find out who you are

Biometric characteristics







http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~jgd1000/UK_IRIS.png



http://i.dailymail.co.uk/i/pix/2012/02/17/article-0-11C5E3C400005DC-346_468x286.jpg




<http://www.nuance.com/for-business/by-solution/customer-service-solutions/solutions-services/inbound-solutions/voice-authentication-biometrics/vocal-password/index.htm>



<http://www.cs.cmu.edu/afs/cs/Web/People/jeongue/jeon/Speaker%20Verification.htm>

Digital signing




- Normal public-key encryption, a problem:
 - Mallory encrypts message with Bob's public key
 - Only Bob can decrypt using his private key
 - Message is a love letter claiming to be from Alice

Digital signing


- Digital signing via public key crypto
 - Alice encrypts message with her private key
 - Everybody can decrypt using Alice's public key
 - But it proves it came from Alice since no one else has her private key
 - Encrypt result with Bob's public key
 - Only Bob can decrypt using his private key
 - **Problem:** asymmetric crypto on entire message can be expensive
 - Hash the message
 - Encrypt just the hash

Hash-based digital signing

Signing



Verification



If the hashes are equal, the signature is valid.

Distributing public keys


- Alice has to find Bob's public key
 - How does she know it is really Bob's?
 - Someone else could impersonate Bob
 - Mallory fools Alice into using her fake version of Bob's public key
 - Mallory decrypts using fake Bob's private key
 - Mallory reads message
 - Reencrypts using Bob's real public key and sends on
- Problems:
 - How do we distribute public keys?
 - How to establish the trust of those keys?

PKI

- Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

- Certificate Authority (CA)


- Verifies user is who they say they are
- Digitally signs the user's public key
- e.g. VeriSign



<http://blog.securism.com/2009/01/summarizing-pki-certificate-validation/>

PGP

- Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)
 - 1991 Phil Zimmermann



"In the past, if the Government wanted to violate the privacy of ordinary citizens, it had to expend a certain amount of effort to intercept and steam open and read paper mail, and listen to and possibly transcribe spoken telephone conversation. This is analogous to catching fish with a hook and a line, one fish at a time. Fortunately for freedom and democracy, this kind of labor-intensive monitoring is not practical on a large scale.

Today, electronic mail is gradually replacing conventional paper mail, and is soon to be the norm for everyone, not the novelty it is today. Unlike paper mail, E mail messages are just too easy to intercept and scan for interesting keywords. This can be done easily, routinely, automatically, and undetectably on a grand scale. This is analogous to driftnet fishing-- making a quantitative and qualitative Orwellian difference to the health of democracy."

-Philip Zimmermann, testimony to Congress

PGP

- Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

- Focus on efficiency

- Key idea:

- RSA for key exchange

- Faster symmetric cipher (IDEA) for bulk of data encryption

- Focus on ease of use

- Allow average Joe to use strong cryptography

- User clicks to encrypt/sign an email

- First widely available public-key crypto

- Released via friend to the Usenet


- Problems:

- RSA was patented by RSA Data Security, Inc.

- Strong encryption considered a munition by US

K_M : One-time message key for IDEA

\otimes : Concatenation



- Key length

- 384 bits = casual, broken easily today
- 512 bits = commercial, breakable by 3-letter orgs
- 1024 bits = military, not breakable on earth
- 2048 bits = alien, unbreakable on other planets

Securing web commerce

- Customer fills out order with credit card #
 - **Problem 1:** Keep data secure from customer's browser to the web server
 - **Problem 2:** keep data secure on server or in transit to order fulfillment

SSL

- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) / Transport Layer Security (TLS)
 - Client requests secure connection from server
 - Client sends list ciphers/hash functions supported
 - Server picks the strongest mutual cipher/hash
 - Server sends back digital certificate
 - Name of itself, trusted Certificate Authority (CA), public encryption key
 - Client contacts CA to confirm key belongs to site
 - Client generates session key by encrypting random number with server's public key
 - Client and server continue using symmetric cipher

HTTPS

- Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS)
 - https://
 - Typically running on port 443

Application (HTTP)
Security (SSL)
Transport (TCP)
Network (IP)
Data link (PPP)
Physical (modem, ADSL, cable TV)

Summary

- Proving who you are
 - Passwords, tokens, biometrics
 - Digital signing using public key crypto
- Secure hash functions
 - Digital signing, storage of passwords, detecting changes in files
- PGP
 - Popular application of public key crypto
- Secure web commerce
 - SSL/TLS